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A New Way to Look at the Data: Similarities Between Groups of People
Are Large and Important
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Most published research focuses on describing differences, while neglecting similarities that are arguably at
least as interesting and important. In Study 1, we modified and extended prior procedures for describing
similarities and demonstrate the importance of this exercise by examining similarities between groups on 22
social variables (e.g., moral attitudes, human values, and trust) within 6 commonly used social categories:
gender, age, education, income, nation of residence, and religious denomination (N  86,272). On average,
the amount of similarity between 2 groups (e.g., high vs. low educated or different countries) was greater than
90%. Even large effect sizes revealed more similarities than differences between groups. Studies 2–5
demonstrated the importance of presenting information about similarity in research reports. Compared
with the typical presentation of differences (e.g., barplots with confidence intervals), similarity infor-
mation led to more accurate lay perceptions and to more positive attitudes toward an outgroup. Barplots
with a restricted y-axis led to a gross underestimation of similarities (i.e., a gross overestimation of the
differences), and information about similarities was rated as more comprehensible. Overall, the presen-
tation of similarity information achieves more balanced scientific communication and may help address
the file drawer problem.
Keywords: similarities, differences, gender, cross-cultural, education
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000154.supp
We are far more united and have far more in common with each other
than things that divide us.
—Jo Cox (murdered British Member of Parliament; Jo Cox maiden
speech in the House of Commons. (2016, June 17)).
Since Donald Trump won the election for the United States pres-
idency in November 2016, an increase in racist attacks by 91% was
reported in the first half of 2017 (CAIR: Hate crimes against Muslims
spike after Trump win. (2017, July 18)). This increased racism par-
allels a sharp rise in the level of openly racist incidents after a narrow
majority of British voters voted to leave the European Union in June
2016 (Furness, 2018; Versi, 2016) and the recent upsurge of support
for right-wing parties across Europe (Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral,
2013). A key characteristic of racism is its focus on the idea that
out-groups are different from and inferior to the in-group. Here, we
suggest that quantitative social science may be inadvertently helping
to foster these beliefs by focusing on differences between groups and
neglecting to highlight stronger and important similarities.
For instance, if social scientists were comparing two groups of
people with respect to moral attitudes, the researchers could de-
scribe either the differences or the similarities between the
groups—or, indeed, both. Historically, the focus of social science
research in general and psychological research in particular has
been on the description of differences between groups. Over 90%
of the published research findings in psychology describe statisti-
cally significant differences (Fanelli, 2010; Open Science Collab-
oration, 2015). Most of the inferential statistics and effect sizes
used are only appropriate for measuring mean differences, and
studies that “fail” to find significant differences are consigned to a
literal or metaphorical file-drawer.
The lack of recognition that similarities matter is important
because differences between groups with so-called “large” effect
sizes can occur even when two groups are much more similar than
different, as described below. Moreover, this possibility is appli-
cable whenever people are clustered into groups based on a spe-
cific variable, including many demographic variables studied in
psychology (e.g., gender, age, education, and culture). We illus-
trate these points in this article, beginning with a discussion of
current approaches to comparing groups, before we describe the
need to capture similarities between groups in a way that goes
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clearly beyond failing to reject the null hypothesis and statistical
equivalence. Finally, we argue that the inclusion of information on
similarities instead of an exclusive focus on differences has a range
of important implications, such as more accurate perceptions of
findings and more positive attitudes toward an outgroup.
A General Test of Similarities and Methodology
The presentation of research findings typically focuses on
means, line graphs, bar graphs, p levels, or Bayes factors. These
modes of presentation mainly focus on differences. When two or
more groups are compared, researchers also tend to assume that a
null difference indicates high similarity, whereas a statistically
significant result reflects low similarity. However, while the null
difference potentially affirms (or at least fails to refute) high
similarity, a significant and/or large difference is not diagnostic of
low similarity. Consider national differences in an important con-
temporary topic: trust in science. Figure 1 displays Americans’
(n  2,202) and Yemenis’ (n  911) trust in science, as reported
in the World Value Survey (WVS; see below and online supple-
mental materials). Larger scale values (i.e., toward 10) reflect
greater trust in science. As shown in Figure 1A, superimposing one
density distribution on the other reveals a large overlap between
the two samples. Most Americans chose response options that
were also frequently chosen by Yemenis. Other ways of depicting
the data also reveal large overlap. Figure 1B displays two Kernel
distributions, which have been smoothed to the data. Figure 1C
displays two histograms with five bars, and Figure 1D displays two
histograms with 18 bars. All figures show high overlap, although
a Welch’s t test of statistical difference reveals that Yemenis have
significantly greater trust in science, t(1660.20)  12.86, p 
.0001, with a moderate effect size, Cohen’s d .51, and the Bayes
factor is1034, using Rouder’s default JZS of r .71 (cf. Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Overall, notwithstand-
ing the moderate effect size, the vanishingly small p value, and the
enormous Bayes factor, 80% of the responses are shared between
the groups. The similarities are visibly far larger than the differ-
ences.
To make similarities more apparent in research reports, it is
important to apply a general and easy-to-use method for quanti-
fying similarity across diverse research domains. Although re-
searchers have called for greater examination and discussion of
similarities, especially in cross-cultural research (Berry, Poortinga,
Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011; Brouwers, Hemert,
Breugelmans, & van de Vijver, 2004), a coherent approach to
describing similarity has been absent. Our proposal is to avoid the
problems associated with overreliance on both null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST) and Bayesian statistics by supple-
menting them with information about similarities. To support this
aim, we have reexamined a generally neglected measure of simi-
larity and developed two new methods for assessing similarity.
As background to understanding these new methods, it is im-
portant to consider current approaches to testing differences and to
effect sizes representing differences. For example, a two-sample
t test, one of the most commonly used tests in psychology, exam-
ines only the probability that two means are from the same pop-
ulation, while relying on the hypothesized distribution of the
means and neglecting the actual distribution of the data. In other
words, a t test can only help to ascertain whether the two means are
likely to come from the same distribution; it does not allow any
inferences about overlap across the breadth of the actual distribu-
tions. Similarly, one of the most popular indices of effect size,
Cohen’s d, measures the differences between two means in units of
variability (J. Cohen, 1988). A possible and often neglected appli-
cation of d is that it can be transformed to yield an overlap
coefficient (OVL), which allows one to draw conclusions about the
distribution of all the data, not just the means, by estimating the
percentage of overlap between two normal distributions (Inman &
Bradley, 1989). In other words, the OVL helps one to assess simi-
Figure 1. Different ways of presenting extent of Trust in Science in United States and Yemen, with d  .51
and 80% overlap of the distributions. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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larity. Surprisingly, the OVL is rarely known and even missing in
reviews of effect sizes for between-subjects designs (e.g., Lakens,
2013; Peng & Chen, 2014). For example, even a large effect size of
Cohen’s d  .80 (J. Cohen, 1992) represents an overlap of 69%; a
medium effect size of d  .50 represents an overlap of 80%; and a
small effect size of d  .20 represents an overlap of 92% (see
Figure 2).
In the online supplemental materials, we compare the OVL with
six additional measures of similarities: the intraclass correlation
(ICC[1]), the probability of superiority, a nonparametric version of
the OVL, a new measure we developed to explicitly calculate the
percentage of common scores (PCS), equivalence tests, and re-
sponse surface analysis. We have developed the PCS to probe the
robustness of the OVL, which relies on the assumption of normal-
ity. The PCS, which is described in more details in the online
supplemental materials, can be interpreted as the percentage of one
group that has the same scale responses as the other group, while
controlling for different sample sizes and standardizing across
response-scale lengths. Because the OVL and PCS are almost
perfectly correlated (rs  .96), we argue that it is useful to
multiply the OVL by 100 and label this new index as the “per-
centage of common responses” (PCR), on the grounds that this
simple percentage is a more concrete and familiar way to express
similarity than an abstract decimal proportion representing “over-
lap.”
However, the PCR, like the conceptually related measures such
as the percentage of common scores, the ICC[1], and the proba-
bility of superiority measure, neglects one other vital consideration
for quantifying similarity: the absolute difference between the two
means or medians, given a specific measurement scale. For exam-
ple, small variances result in larger ds: If the SD is reduced by x,
d will be increased by x. In other words, even small mean differ-
ences can result in large effect sizes and low estimates of similarity
in distributions. For this reason, interpretation of the PCR needs to
be supplemented with a measure of the absolute difference be-
tween two populations. To illustrate, consider once again the
example of trust in science. To anticipate analyses reported below,
we compared all 60 countries from the WVS with each other
pairwise, resulting in 1,770 comparisons. On the basis of the
“classical” approach that focuses on mean differences, one might
conclude that countries differ considerably in their trust in science.
The average d is 0.31, and the largest d is 1.60 (between India and
Libya, M 6.05, SD 2.10, median 6.33, vs. M 8.92, SD
1.53, median  9.67). Many of the mean differences between any
Figure 2. Illustration of the percentage of common responses (PCR) for different Cohen’s ds. The design of
the figure was inspired by Kristoffer Magnusson’s interactive visualization on http://rpsychologist.com/d3/
cohend/.
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two given countries are statistically significant, which is not sur-
prising given an average sample size of 1,438 per country. A few
of the mean differences also seem appreciable when considered
alongside the percentage of common responses for some countries.
For example, the PCR between India and Libya is only 42. How-
ever, the picture looks different when the median scores are
considered. Participants in these two countries (and indeed in each
of the 60 countries) scored significantly higher on average than the
midpoint of the 10-point Likert scale (see Figure 3). In short,
people in all of the nations exhibit a high trust in science.
This similarity in central tendency can be captured by calculat-
ing the absolute effect (AE), which we define simply as the median
difference expressed as the percentage of the largest possible
difference: 100  (median Group A—median Group B)/(scale
maximum—scale minimum). If the median difference is 0.50,
measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, the AE would be
100  .5/(6 –1)  10. This statistic is a generalization of the
percentage of the maximum possible score metric (POMP; P.
Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999), which has been designed
to standardize single case observations across scales (e.g.,
school grades from different countries) to a two-group comparison.
Thus, the AE is the difference between two POMP scores with the
medians used as observations. In contrast to distribution-dependent
measures such as Cohen’s d or PCR, the AE is independent from
the type of distribution and the variance while taking the scale
range into account. While Cohen’s d is the mean difference rela-
tive to the SD, the absolute effect is the median difference relative
to the scale range. In the current example, calculating the AE
reveals that the proportion of the median difference in trust in
science between countries is rather small (median AE  7; the
maximum AE of 37 is between India and Libya, 95% confidence
interval, CI [37, 41]).1
Despite their conceptual independence, PCR and AE are nega-
tively related in the data we examined (see below). In combination,
these indices allow researchers to describe whether two groups are
more similar or different: If the PCR is 50 and AE 50,
similarities between two groups are larger than the differences. If
the PCR is 50 and the AE 50, the two groups are more
different than similar. We argue that it is important to take both
effect size estimates into account to determine whether groups are
more similar or more different because a large PCR can arise when
the SDs are rather small while the means and medians are still on
one side of the scale, as in the example displayed in Figure 3 for
the variable trust in science. Thus, there is a clearer case for
relatively strong group differences when the distributions show
less than 50% overlap and on average the groups fall on a different
side of the scale. Of course, it is possible that the PCR is less
than 50 and the AE is less than 50. In this case, we would argue
that it is undetermined whether groups are more different than
similar. This situation is akin to the stalemate that occurs for other
statistical procedures that rely on more than one statistic. For
example, in structural equation modeling, it can happen that one
set of fit indices indicates reasonable fit (e.g., comparative fit index
[CFI]/Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI]  .90), while the other set of
indices suggests a bad fit (e.g., Root Mean Square Error of Ap-
proximation  .10; root mean square error of approximation).
Nonetheless, as noted above, the empirical relations between PCR
and AE make this situation comparatively unlikely.
Implications of Documenting Similarities
We argue that a stronger focus on similarities between groups
has a range of important implications, such as improved intergroup
attitudes, more accurate perceptions of effect sizes, more balanced
scientific communication, and reduction of the metaphorical file
drawer problem. We discuss the first two implications in this
subsection, because we will directly test them in the present article,
whereas the other implications are outlined in the General Discus-
sion.
Similarities between groups are often ignored in the reporting of
results, even though they have a fundamental relevance to the
“take-home” message for readers. For example, an empirical re-
port could highlight the fact that Americans trust science less than
Yemenis, but this emphasis would miss the fact that both groups
trust science to a great extent. This omission is potentially signif-
icant: Research in social cognition has found that focusing on
similarities versus differences fundamentally affects how people
interpret information about others (Mussweiler, 2003; Suls &
Wheeler, 2000). Further, abundant research has found that high-
lighting similarities between groups improves interpersonal and
intergroup attitudes (Brown & Abrams, 1986; Byrne, 1961; Mon-
toya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Pilkington & Lydon, 1997).
Neglect of similarities in scientific reporting directs readers’ rea-
soning in a way that is likely to exacerbate the imputation of
differences.
We further argue that highlighting similarity information will
result in a more accurate perception of effect sizes. This is because
similarity information facilitates inferences about the whole dis-
tribution of responses rather than some truncated information (e.g.,
means and SEs). Also, the PCR should be easier to interpret
because it relies on one of the most often used statistics in every-
day life, percentage. In contrast, the interpretation of Cohen’s d as
“standardized mean difference” is more technical and abstract in
relation to the data. (Study 2 demonstrates the implications of this
difference for ease of comprehensibility.)
Similarity information may be more informative particularly
when results are visually presented. For example, it was argued
that a barplot with a restricted (truncated) y-axis causes an effect to
appear larger than it actually is (Huff, 1954), whereas superim-
posed normal distributions or histograms (see Figure 1) provide a
more complete picture of the responses. The latter visual methods
provide information about the full distribution of responses and not
only sample-size dependent information of the distribution (e.g.,
SE, CI). Indeed, it was recently argued that graphs in biology rely
too often on summary statistics, as in bar and line graphs (Weiss-
gerber, Milic, Winham, & Garovic, 2015). Instead, the authors
recommended the use of graphs containing distributional informa-
tion such as unidimensional scatterplots. This call was also made
by Lane and Sándor (2009) who suggested boxplots, back-to-back
histograms, or back-to-back stem-and-leaf displays. In the current
research, we tested directly whether graphs that highlight similar-
ities are considered to be more informative and allow readers to
1 The confidence intervals (CIs) for the absolute effect were boot-
strapped based on 10,000 samples (see R code online). The CIs might not
be symmetrically around the absolute effect (AE) because the distribution
of the bootstrapped AEs is often skewed. The CIs for the percentage of
common responses (PCR) were also bootstrapped.
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form more accurate estimations of the effect sizes than barplots
with restricted y-axes.
We focus here on comparisons of barplots with restricted
y-axes because these are still the dominant method of data
presentation in psychology, despite Huff’s observation over 60
years ago (Huff, 1954). The majority of graphs in two leading
psychological journals were bar graphs “and only about 10% of
the graphs showed distributional information beyond central
tendency” (Sándor & Lane, 2007; as cited in Lane & Sándor,
2009, p. 240). This is not surprising given that a restricted
y-axis highlights what most researchers are testing for, mean
differences, more clearly than a graph with an unrestricted
y-axis. Thus, it is important to test for potential detrimental
effects of restricted y-axis graphs in comparison with other
formats that provide information about distributional overlap.
The Present Research
In Study 1, we provide a broad demonstration of the utility
and importance of calculating similarity indices by testing for
similarities across six categories: gender, age, education, in-
come, countries, and religious denomination. We tested for
similarities on 22 dependent variables, including human values,
moral attitudes, and trust in other people. These choices were
made with an eye to examining variables that have often been
reported as showing important differences between people. If
there is evidence of high similarity in these tests, the data would
provide an important caveat to prior conclusions about differ-
ences.
In large, representative international samples, the present
research addressed this issue using the new indices, PCR and
AE, together with Cohen’s d and the percentage of common
scores (PCS, see below and online supplemental materials) for
the purpose of comparison. Within a given category (e.g.,
countries), we compared each group with each other (e.g.,
Americans with Yemenis) to compute all the statistics. For
example, we compared 60 countries pairwise, resulting in 1,770
comparisons for each statistic and variable. For the remaining
five categories, we conducted 148 pairwise comparisons: 21 for
religious denominations, 1 for gender (male vs. female), 36 for
education, 45 for income, and 45 for age. In total, we conducted
168,784 pairwise comparisons. CIs for the PCRs and AEs were
bootstrapped.
We expected to find large correlations between the PCR, AE,
and the other measure of similarity, PCS. We then explored
potential differences in levels of similarity across our compar-
isons. For example, we tested whether people were less similar
to each other when clustered in different income groups than
when clustered in countries, as Greenfield (2014) proposed.
Furthermore, we explored which variables show more similar-
ities and which variables show fewer similarities across all six
categories.
Studies 2–5 were designed to test several implications of
emphasizing similarities rather than differences when reporting
scientific findings. In Study 2, we tested whether highlighting
similarities when presenting comparisons between groups leads
to a more accurate estimate of the actual degree of similarity
between groups than when differences are highlighted. Further,
we were interested in whether certain types of graphs are rated
as more comprehensible than others, and whether the PCR and
PCS are easier for a layperson to understand than Cohen’s d.
Studies 3 to 5 replicated and extended Study 2 by testing
whether emphasizing similarities also leads to more positive
attitudes toward members of an outgroup. For this, we relied on
archival data (Studies 3 and 4) and on influential studies within
psychology.
The R code used to obtain the results of Study 1 and most of the
results of Studies 2–5 along with the data of Studies 2–5 can be
Figure 3. Median score of trust in science per country. The horizontal line represents the scale midpoint.
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found at https://osf.io/bxu5m/ (the dataset used in Study 1 is
publicly available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
Study 1
Method
Participants. We used the most recent version of the WVS at
the time of conducting our analyses (6th round; April 2015), which
includes 86,272 participants (51.20% female) from 60 countries
with a mean age of 41.68 years (SD  16.58).
Material. Our independent variables were gender, age, edu-
cation, income, country of residence, and religious denomination.
Gender was measured dichotomously as male or female. The
continuous variable year of birth was divided into 10 equal sized
groups, ranging from “born in 1946 or before” to “born in 1991 or
later” to allow pairwise comparisons. Education was measured on
a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (no formal education; n 4,604) to
9 (university-level education with degree; n  14,260). To esti-
mate income, participants were asked to indicate their household
net income, relative to the country-specific income distribution, on
a 10-point scale from 1 (lowest group) to 10 (highest group). For
country, we used all 60 countries in the WVS. More than 1,000
participants indicated that they belong to one of the following
seven religious denominations: Buddhism (n 3861), Evangelical
(n  1411), Hindu (n  1742), Muslim (n  21,230), Orthodox
(n  8505), Protestant (n  5562), and Roman Catholic (n 
14,921).
The 22 dependent variables included the 10 value types postu-
lated by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992). They were measured in the
WVS with a short version of the Portrait Value Questionnaire
(Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2001), containing one item per
value type. This measure asks participants to rate the extent to
which each description (portrait) of another person is similar to
them. Example descriptions include “Adventure and taking risks
are important to this person; to have an exciting life” (stimulation)
and “It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money
and expensive things” (power). Responses were given on a 6-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me
at all). We chose the other 12 variables by considering the scales
within the WVS, the findings of previous studies, and the results of
principal component analyses (PCAs). For instance, although trust
in other people had been measured in previous studies with a
single scale (Jen, Sund, Johnston, & Jones, 2010), we created two
factors from the six items, based on the results of a PCA (varimax
rotation). All six items were answered on a 4-point scale from 1
(trust completely) to 4 (do not trust at all). The first factor
represents trust in strangers, and is based on trust in people met for
the first time, trust in people of a different religion, and trust in
people from a different country (  .79). The second factor
represents trust in people with whom one is close (family, neigh-
bors, and people known personally;   .58). The correlation
between the two factors was of medium size, r(83,962)  .35.
Other variables were understanding of democracy (6 items,  
.74), trust in political institutions (6 items,   .87), perceived
respect for the elderly in society (3 items,   .71), ageism
(4 items,   .60), trust in science (3 items,   .73), skepticism
toward science (3 items,   .56). Trust in science was uncorre-
lated with skepticism toward science, r(83,686)  .07. Further,
the items of the Morally Debatable Scale (Harding & Phillips,
1986) were divided into three subscales after a PCA (cf. Vauclair
& Fischer, 2011): attitudes toward personal-sexual behaviors (e.g.,
justifiability of homosexuality, 7 items,   .89), dishonest-illegal
behaviors (e.g., stealing, 5 items,   .83), and domestic violence
(e.g., a man beating his wife, 3 items,   .78). Higher scores on
these attitude scales signify greater agreement. Finally, political
attitude was measured with a single item, on which participants
could indicate their position on a left-right political dimension
from 1 (left; n  3459) to 10 (right; n  5354), with most
participants identifying themselves as in the middle (5 items, n 
19,005).
Results
We summarize important findings for each category, followed
by comparisons between all categories. Detailed tables of results
can be found in the online supplemental materials. The analyses
focus on the two similarity measures we propose, PCR and AE. As
expected, these were negatively correlated, r(130)  .65, p 
.001. Of importance, the PCR, despite being a parametric measure,
is robust against violations of normality assumptions: There is a
large correlation between PCR and PCS (rs  .95 to .98), a
nonparametric index of similarity described in the online supple-
mental materials, and the average difference between them is only
2%.2
Findings within each category. As expected, there were high
levels of similarity within categories. For all variables, the median
PCR between two groups is 95.00 (M  93.30, SD  5.37,
range  71–100), and the AE is 2% (M  5.45%, SD  .07,
range  0–20), indicating large similarities. Only 274 out of
41,821 pairwise comparisons (0.66%) for both effect sizes com-
bined revealed a PCR of less than 50% and an AE of more than
50%. All of these 274 cases were found in the country category
(see Supplementary Table 1). For illustration, Figure 4 shows
selected pairwise comparisons for five of the six categories. These
comparisons were partly selected based on their relevance to
previous literature. For example, Schwartz and Rubel (2005) found
that the largest mean difference between women and men for
human values (Schwartz, 1992) can be found for power (Figure
4E), whereas Robinson (2013) found one of the strongest age
effects for stimulation (Figure 4F). Comparisons for country can
be found in Figures 1, 7, and 10.
Countries. Countries were less similar to each other than were
the groups in the other categories. The average PCR across all 22
variables was 84 (range  71–90) and the average AE was 14%
(range 0 to 20%). The two variables with the smallest PCRs and
largest AEs were moral attitudes toward personal-sexual issues
and moral attitudes toward (domestic) violence (PCRs  6, 95%
CI [4, 7], and 28, 95% CI [23, 33]; AEs  67%, 95% CI [65, 69]
and 41%, 95% CI [41, 41]): Participants from Pakistan considered
liberal personal-sexual behaviors (e.g., abortion, homosexuality)
2 We consider our newly developed measure, the percentage of common
scores (PCS), to be as valid as the percentage of common responses (PCR),
which is why we have also reported the results of the PCS in the online
supplemental materials. However, we recommend the PCR because it is
easier to compute, for example with this short command in R: 2 
pnorm((-abs(d))/2)  100, and because people judge it more accurately
(see Study 2).
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least justifiable (M  1.63, median  1.14), whereas those from
the Netherlands (M  6.69, median  7.14) and Sweden (me-
dian  7.14) found them most justifiable. Participants in 28
countries reported that (domestic) violence is not justifiable (M 
2, medians  1), whereas participants from Rwanda found it
relatively more justifiable (M  4.50, median  4.67; the PCR
reported above is from the comparison of Rwanda with Sweden:
Sweden is one of the 28 countries with a median of 1 for attitudes
toward domestic violence). However, the average Rwandan re-
ported that (domestic) violence is less justifiable than justifiable, as
did the average respondent from the other 59 countries (Supple-
mentary Table 1); the largest AE for these 1,700 pairwise com-
parisons was 41%.
Religious denomination. Pairwise comparisons were made
for seven religious denominations. The average amount of simi-
larities across 22 dependent variables was large (PCR  91,
range  84–96) and the average AE was 5% (range  0 to 20%).
The smallest PCR was with respect to moral attitudes toward
(domestic) violence (PCR  66, 95% CI [63, 68]; AE  22%,
95% CI [19, 22]), with Evangelicals reporting related behaviors as
less justifiable (M  1.77, median  1) than Hindoos (M  3.59,
median  3).
Income. The amount of similarities was again large with an
average PCR of 96 (range  92–98) and an average AE of 4%
(range  0 to 20%). The smallest similarity occurred for political
attitudes (PCR  79, 95% CI [76, 82]; AE  22%, 95% CI [22,
33]), with participants in the second lowest income group having
a stronger proleft attitude (M  5.44, median  5) than those in
the highest income group (M  6.77, median  7).
Education. Similarities between educational groups were
large: The average PCR was 96 (range  91–98) and the average
AE was 2% (range  0 to 10%). The smallest similarity was in
moral attitudes toward liberal personal-sexual behaviors (PCR 
74, 95% CI [73, 75]; AE  19%, 95% CI [17, 19]), with partic-
ipants having the lowest educational level reporting them to be
least justifiable (M  2.50, median  2.00), and those with the
highest educational level reporting them to be relatively more
justifiable (M  3.94, median  3.67).
Gender. The amount of similarity was again large with an
average PCR of 97 (range  90–100) and an average AE of 3%
(range  0 to 20%). The smallest similarity was for the value type
stimulation (PCR 90, 95% CI [90, 91]; AE 20%, 95% CI [20,
20]), with women reporting it to be less important (M  3.87,
Figure 4. Selected pairwise comparisons for the six categories. See the online article for the color version of
this figure.
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median  4) than men did (M  3.49, median  3), with lower
values indicating greater importance.
Age. The amount of similarity was again large with an average
PCR of 96 (range  88–99) and an average AE of 4% (range 
0 to 20%). The smallest similarity was for the value type stimu-
lation (PCR 65, 95% CI [64, 66]; AE 40%, 95% CI [40, 40]),
with those born in 1946 or earlier valuing stimulation less than
those born after 1990 (M  4.36 vs. 3.02, medians  5 vs. 3,
respectively, with lower values indicating greater importance).
Although we cannot distinguish between age and cohort effects in
these comparisons, the issue is tangential to our current focus.
Comparisons between all categories. To identify the catego-
ries for which similarities were the largest, we compared the PCRs
and AEs between the six categories across the 22 variables. That
is, we treated the variables as cases, and subjected the PCRs and
AEs to 6-level (category type) repeated-measures analysis of vari-
ances (ANOVAs). Because of violations of the sphericity assump-
tion, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. Both the
PCRs (F(2.46, 51.72)  85.57, p  .001, p2  .80) and the AEs
(F(3.80, 79.81) 15.63, p .001, p2  .43) differed significantly
between categories. For both statistics, pairwise comparisons re-
vealed that countries were less similar to each other than were the
groups in each of the other categories (all ps  .001). Countries
were less similar to each other (MPCR  84, MAE  14) than were
religious denominations (MPCR  90, MAE  6), income groups
(MPCR  96, MAE  4), educational groups (MPCR  96, MAE 
2), women and men (MPCR  97, MAE  3), and age cohorts
(MPCR  96, MAE  4).
A second category where the degree of similarity was somewhat
lower compared with the remaining four categories was religious
denomination (ps  .001), but this applied only for the PCR
measure; the differences for AE were less consistent (see Supple-
mentary Tables 1 to 6). The difference in PCR between religious
denominations and the remaining four categories ranged between
5.41 and 6.86, indicating smaller levels of similarities between
religious denominations, relative to those for income, education,
gender, and age.
Discussion
The objective of Study 1 was to report the magnitude of simi-
larities between groups of people across six important psycholog-
ical categories and 22 topical variables. Across all variables, the
average PCR was 93 when we compared people from different
genders, ages, educational attainments, incomes, countries, and
religious denominations. This high level of similarity was corrob-
orated by the AE. The median AE revealed that the difference
between any two groups across all categories and variables was
only one-twentieth of the possible difference on the scale in
question. Furthermore, these findings were replicated in a similar
study of a different dataset, containing responses from 29 Euro-
pean countries (N  54,082), as reported in the online supplemen-
tal materials.
Countries were on average less similar to each other than were
the groups in other categories. This challenges the claim that
countries are more similar to each other than are people with
different socioeconomic status (Greenfield, 2014). The lowest
degree of similarity across all comparisons was for moral attitudes
toward personal and sexual issues. This finding is broadly consis-
tent with Graham et al.’s (2011) evidence that the largest differ-
ences between various groups of people—mainly conservatives
and liberals—is on the moral dimension purity, which is closely
related to moral attitudes toward personal and sexual issues.
Notwithstanding the evidence of smaller similarities between
countries than between groups in the other categories, the high
average degree of similarity between countries supports the uni-
versalism claim in cross-cultural research, which holds that values,
attitudes, and beliefs are weakly influenced by cultural factors
(Berry et al., 2011). At the same time, however, we can now be
more confident that country has a relatively strong influence on
variables like human values, independently of religious denomi-
nation, education and income level, or age distribution. If country
differences were mainly because of differences in religious de-
nomination, education level, or age distribution, we would have
found groups in these categories to be less similar to each other
than countries. By contrast, we found that countries were less
similar to each other than were groups in these other categories.
It is important to keep in mind that we could have presented all
of our comparisons without PCR and AE data and focused only on
effect sizes quantifying differences (e.g., d scores). For example,
we could merely have concluded that differences between coun-
tries are larger (Md  .39) than differences between groups in the
other categories (for the Cohen’s ds see online supplemental
materials). Such a focus would tell a different story, focusing on
large ds, and ignoring the large number of small effects. Not only
would such an approach result in most of the results attracting little
attention because of small effect sizes (i.e., ending up in a virtual
file-drawer), but a focus on large effect sizes would also have
obscured the fact that the similarities are very large in many cases.
Adding PCR and AE to the analyses helps to put the interpretation
of d-scores, p values, and/or Bayes factors into perspective and
increases the interpretability of the findings, as Study 2 demon-
strates.
We are not suggesting that differences are unimportant. Instead,
we argue that adding information about the amount of similarity
helps one to arrive at a more balanced and intuitive understanding
of the effect size than would be the case if one is only provided
with the difference test effects sizes. In Studies 2–5, we test this
argument by presenting data visually in ways that emphasize either
similarities or differences. We use also these studies as an exercise
in demonstrating how similarities can be reported and interpreted
alongside differences. These studies focus on similarity indices in
the context of pairwise comparisons, because to the best of our
knowledge no similarity index for more complex designs (e.g.,
two-way ANOVAs) has yet been developed.
Study 2
Study 2 focused on whether reporting similarities compared
with differences leads to more accurate perceptions of effects in
lay reading of reports. Specifically, we explored which of three
ways of displaying the same results, superimposed normal distri-
butions, barplots with CIs, and superimposed histograms (see
Figure 3), yields a more accurate estimation of similarities and is
perceived as clearer and more informative. We selected superim-
posed normal distributions and histograms rather than boxplots,
which were recommended as alternatives to bar- and line-plots
(Lane & Sándor, 2009), and rather than violin-, ridgeline-, pirate-,
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or other types of plots, which display the full distribution of the
data, because box-, ridgeline-, or violin-plots are usually presented
next to each other and are not superimposed. Consequently, they
do not highlight similarities to the same extent as the two types of
graphs we are using. This does not mean that we consider these
other types of graphs uninformative. In contrast, violin-plots with
integrated boxplots are informative for results that are not de-
scribed for the purpose of expressing similarities directly, because
these plots nonetheless contain useful information about the type
of distribution and a central tendency estimate (i.e., the median).
More important, these plots are only useful when a few groups are
compared. Superimposed graphs or violin-plots might be over-
loaded if there are too many groups compared (see Figure 6 for an
example).
Method
Participants. There were 291 participants (Mage  33.75,
SD  11.17, 46% women) who remained in the analysis after
excluding 24 participants because they failed an instruction check
twice (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), and 1 partic-
ipant was excluded because he or she responded to all items with
0. Participants were recruited via a paid online platform.
Materials and procedure. Three types of graphs were cre-
ated, displaying simulated data with 1,500 participants in each
group (i.e., the average sample size per country in the World
Values Survey data). Data were simulated from a normal distri-
bution, with a SD of 0.80 and an overall mean of 3. The three types
of graphs are depicted in Figure 5: a graphical representation of the
overlapping distributions assessed by the PCR measure, a default
barplot with 95% CIs, and superimposed histograms that represent
the PCS measure. Note that using a CI as error bars rather than SEs
is a conservative measure, because bars representing SEs would
have made the differences look larger. For each type of graph, nine
versions were created with varying effect sizes: d  0, 0.20, 0.40,
0.50, 0.60, 0.80, 1, 1.5, and 2. Participants were randomly allo-
cated to rate one type of graph. The instructions for the partici-
pants were “In your opinion, to what extent do the data as
depicted in this plot indicate that the two groups A and B are
different or similar? Each group consists of around 1500 peo-
ple.” To make the variable more concrete, we labeled it socia-
bility. Participants responded on a slider measure, ranging from
0 (very different) to 100 (very similar). Also, for each graph,
participants rated how comprehensible they found the figure on
a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely incomprehensible) to
5 (extremely comprehensible).3
Participants then ranked which of three types of statement
(presented in random order) is the clearest and most informative
way to describe scientific findings: “The difference between men
and women was Cohen’s d  .43 with Cohen’s d being the
difference in the two groups’ means divided by the average of their
standard deviations,” “The overlap of the responses given by men
and women was 83 percent,” and “83 percent of the responses
given by men were mirrored by women.” Finally, participants
responded to some demographic items, including their education
level and their statistical training, before being debriefed and
thanked.
Results and Discussion
We first compared participants with a university degree and
some or a lot of statistical training with the other participants, but
obtained no significant interaction between graph type and educa-
tional level (Fs(2, 283)  2.04, ps  .13) or statistical expertise
(Fs(2, 283)  1.57, ps  .18). Therefore, we report the results
across educational levels and statistical training.
Next, we tested the influence of mode of presentation on per-
ceived similarity. All but one of the nine between-subjects one-
way ANOVAs reached statistical significance (see Table 1), indi-
cating that mode of presentation had an impact on the perceived
similarity between two groups. We observed a linear pattern, with
the superimposed normal distribution plots leading to the most
accurate perceptions, followed by the barplots, and the superim-
posed histograms (see Figure 6). In other words, people were more
accurate at estimating similarities with the measure that repre-
sented the PCR than with any other measure. For example, for
graphs displaying medium effect size (i.e., d  0.50), the mean
estimated amount of similarity was 78% for the superimposed
normal distributions, 65% for the barplots displaying the means
and CIs, and 57% for the superimposed histograms. The correct
amount of overlap, using the PCR, is 80%. Thus, as expected,
people underestimate similarities when shown results in the stan-
dard presentation format (means and CIs); they even tend to do so
with the superimposed histograms, but presenting overlapping
normal distributions attenuates the extent of this error. With re-
spect to the comprehensibility ratings, the superimposed normal
distributions were rated as more comprehensible (M  3.92,
median  4, SD  0.93) than the barplot condition (M  3.59,
median  4, SD  1.12, p  .03, PCR  87, 95% CI [78, 98],
AE  0, 95% CI [0, 0], d  0.32), and histogram condition (M 
3.50, SD  1.13, p  .006, PCR  84, 95% CI [73, 95], AE  0,
95% CI [0, 0], d  0.40).
Finally, we examined participants’ ranking of the three methods
as ways of presenting scientific findings. As a measure of effect
size, we report the generalized G2 ˆ G2 , computed with the ez
package in R (Lawrence, 2015), because of its comparability
across many research designs (Olejnik & Algina, 2003). A within-
subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of method, F(2,
510)  306.55, p  .001, ˆ G2  .55, with the PCS measure rated
as the clearest and most informative way to present the findings
(M  1.47, SD  0.59), followed by the PCR (M  1.69, SD 
0.55), and then Cohen’s d (M  2.84, SD  0.52). Pairwise
3 We additionally asked participants to rank which of the three graphs
they found easier to read and which one more informative using a within-
subject design (participants saw Figure 5). However, the results were
mixed. A within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) for easier-to-read
was statistically significant, F(2, 538)  174.98, p  .001, with barplots
ranked as the easiest-to-read graphs (M  1.37, SD  0.62), followed by
superimposed normal distributions (M  2.00, SD  0.69), and superim-
posed histograms (M  2.63, SD  0.59). The within-subjects design
allows one to compute common-language effect sizes: Two-hundred par-
ticipants found the barplots easier to read than the superimposed normal
distributions whereas 70 participants found the normal distributions easier
to read. There were 199 participants who found the superimposed normal
distributions easier to read than the superimposed histograms, whereas 71
found the superimposed histograms easier to read. In contrast, there was no
statistically significant difference between the informativeness of the
graphs, F(2, 524)  0.28, p  .76.
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comparisons revealed that the responses to all three groups dif-
fered significantly from each other, ts(255)  3.45, ps  .001.
These results support our contention that the technical framing of
Cohen’s d makes it less easy to comprehend, although we do not
dispute its utility for capturing differences.
Study 3
In Study 3, we replicated and extended Study 2 by using real
data and testing the consequences of emphasizing either simi-
larities or differences for attitudes toward the outgroup. Spe-
cifically, we presented 2,264 British and 1,615 Polish partici-
pants’ ratings of human values in one of three ways
(superimposed normal distributions, bar-plots with a restricted
y-axis, and bar-plot with unrestricted y-axis), which highlighted
similarities or differences between the two groups (see Figure
4). We expected that highlighting similarities (superimposed
normal distributions) would lead to more positive attitudes
among British respondents toward Polish people, compared
with highlighting differences (barplots with restricted y-axis).
We expected the third condition to fall somewhere between the
first two.
Polish people were chosen as an outgroup because they are
the largest immigrant group living in the United Kingdom
(Office for National Statistics, 2016) and around 25% of British
people have less than favorable attitudes toward Polish people
(British Future, 2014). The latter view is echoed by Polish
people: 50% believe that people living in Britain have a nega-
tive attitude toward them (YouGov, 2014). In short, Polish
people were selected because attitudes toward them vary quite
substantially in our participant population.
We acknowledge that it was noted more than 60 years ago
that restricting or truncating the y-axis makes an effect appear
larger than it actually is (Huff, 1954). Nevertheless, based on
our casual observations of journal articles, scientific posters,
and presentations at conferences, bar- and line-graphs with
restricted y-axes are still the predominant ways in which psy-
chological findings are presented: Across all empirical articles
published in 2017 in this journal, 41 used at least one bar- or
line-graph with restricted y-axes to present their findings, while
only 18 used unrestricted y-axes (	2  8.97, p  .003).4
Further, the finding that most graphs do not provide any dis-
tributional information is in line with previous research, which
found across two leading psychological journals that bar graphs
were most common “and only about 10% of the graphs showed
distributional information beyond central tendency” (Sándor &
Lane, 2007; as cited in Lane & Sándor, 2009, p. 240). This
dominant trend is not surprising given that a bar- or line-graph
with a restricted y-axis is clearly effective at highlighting what
most researchers are seeking: mean differences. However,
whether or not this approach is teleological, it is important to
test empirically whether there are potentially detrimental effects
of using restricted y-axes graphs in comparison with other
presentation formats.
Method
Participants. Based on the results of Study 2, we assumed a
medium effect size of f  0.25. A power analysis revealed that
a sample size of 58 participants per cell would be required for a
4 We coded the type of graphs in all articles published in the Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology in 2017 (Volumes 112 and 113). The
majority of articles, 41, used bar- or line-graphs with (an at least some-
what) restricted y-axis and only two of them mentioned in the Figure
caption the full range of the scale. Eighteen articles used unrestricted
y-axes, 12 articles both type of visual presentations, 16 articles used
another type of graph (e.g., scatterplot, mediational model, and forest plot),
and 8 articles used no graphs with data in the main text.
Figure 5. Three modes of depicting the same data: two superimposed normal distributions, a bar chart with
95% confidence intervals, and two superimposed histograms for d  .43 and PCR  83 (percentage of common
responses). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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power of .90. Before any data analysis, four participants who
completed the survey in less than 45 s were excluded. Participants
were recruited online and were compensated with £0.54, which
equates to an hourly wage of £8.19 (average completion time was
237 s). The mean age of the remaining 251 participants was 37.30
(SD  12.39, 62.65% women). There were 162 who had a uni-
versity degree and 88 had less than a university degree. All
participants were born in the United Kingdom, of British nation-
ality, and had not participated in Study 2.
Design. A one-way design with three levels was used, with
type of presentation (superimposed normal distribution, restricted
bar-plot, and unrestricted bar-plot) as a between-subjects factor.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three condi-
tions.
Materials and procedure. Three types of graph were created,
displaying the responses of 2,264 British and 1,615 Polish participants
in the European Social Survey to Schwartz’s (1992) 10 values, which
were measured with the 21-item version of the Portrait Value Ques-
tionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001; 7th round; see Study 1 and the study
reported in the online supplemental materials for more details about
this questionnaire). For each of the 10 values we created one graph of
each type (see Figure 7 for examples for the value type security). The
average PCR across all 10 values was 88 (average AE  6, average
d  .31). All graphs of a given type were presented together (i.e.,
participants saw 10 graphs simultaneously). All participants were told
that they “will be asked to rate the extent to which the graphical
information displayed reflects differences and similarities between
groups of people (e.g., British and Polish). All the figures we present
are based on actual data from large European representative samples.”
This was followed by a link to the Web page of the European Social
Survey and an indication that all the presented data are real. Next,
participants were more specifically informed that they would see
“ratings of 10 human values in large representative samples from two
countries. You will be shown 10 figures displaying the responses to
Table 1
Effects on Perceived Similarity in Nine One-Way Between-Subject ANOVAs and Pairwise Comparisons (Study 2)
Cohen’s d of
graph
Normal
M (SD)
Barplot
M (SD)
Histogram
M (SD) F
Pairwise comparisons with PCR [95% CI]/d
ˆG
2 N-B N-H B-H
0 98.76 (10.20) 90.50 (20.61) 93.24 (21.09) 4.46 .02 80 [70, 91]/0.51 87 [79, 97]/0.33 95 [83, 100]/0.13
.2 90.12 (7.50) 76.93 (23.52) 76.62 (22.62) 23.34 .07 70 [62, 78]/0.76 69 [62, 74]/0.80 99 [87, 100]/0.01
.4 82.65 (11.71) 67.31 (22.60) 60.34 (19.95) 69.75 .18 67 [57, 76]/0.86 50 [40, 59]/1.36 87 [75, 98]/0.33
.5 77.68 (13.49) 64.77 (22.72) 57.18 (21.10) 54.24 .16 73 [63, 83]/0.69 56 [46, 66]/1.15 86 [74, 97]/0.35
.6 73.01 (15.19) 61.78 (20.68) 53.65 (19.92) 52.55 .15 76 [64, 87]/0.62 59 [47, 70]/1.09 84 [72, 95]/0.40
.8 67.97 (13.61) 55.19 (21.84) 47.29 (20.08) 59.27 .17 72 [62, 83]/0.70 55 [44, 65]/1.20 85 [73, 96]/0.38
1 58.97 (16.63) 49.47 (20.98) 43.65 (21.39) 29.47 .09 80 [69, 91]/0.50 69 [57, 80]/0.80 89 [77, 99]/0.27
1.5 47.01 (18.25) 40.05 (18.99) 34.00 (20.79) 22.22 .07 85 [74, 96]/0.37 74 [62, 85]/0.66 88 [76, 99]/0.30
2 31.79 (14.58) 32.39 (20.94) 29.33 (23.99) .74 .00 99 [86, 100]/0.03 95 [83, 100]/0.12 95 [83, 100]/0.14
Note. CI  confidence interval; PCR  percentage of common responses; ANOVA  analysis of variance; AE  absolute effect; Normal (N) 
superimposed normal distributions; barplots (B)  restricted bar-plots; N-B-H: pairwise comparisons with PCR [95% CI] and Cohen’s d. AEs are omitted
for brevity. ANOVA dfs 1/289.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 6. Estimated similarities for plots displaying data for various Cohen’s ds. See the online article for the
color version of this figure.
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one human value at a time, before being asked to respond to four
questions.” The four items were the same in all three conditions. The
first asked how similar the values of British and Polish people are; the
second asked how easily British and Polish people can get along with
each other; the third item was the inclusion of the other in the
self-scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992): “Which of the fol-
lowing 7 pairs of circles best describes the relationship between
British people (self) and Polish people (other)?”; the fourth item asked
for an overall evaluation of a typical Polish person. The first, second,
and fourth items were answered on a slider scale ranging from 0 (very
different/not well at all/extremely unfavorable) to 100 (identical/
perfectly well, extremely favorable). The IOS-item displayed seven
pairs of circles with a varying degree of overlap (from 0% to approx-
imately 80%), with one pair to be selected by the participants. Be-
cause of a technical issue, the fourth item was only displayed to the
last 151 participants.
Results and Discussion
First, we tested whether education moderated any effect of
graph type by including education (lower vs. higher) as a second
factor in the four two-way ANOVAs. However, none of the four
interactions (one for each item) were significant: F(2, 243) 0.69,
p .50, F(2, 243) 0.89, p .42, F(2, 243) 0.62, p .54, and
F(2, 243)  1.53, p  .22, respectively (see Table 2 for the order
of the items). This indicates that education does not moderate the
results.
Next, we performed four one-way ANOVAs. As shown in Table
2, all four ANOVAs were significant and post hoc tests revealed
that the mean differences between the normal distribution and the
restricted barplot conditions were in the expected direction, re-
flecting varying degrees of similarity between the two groups. The
smallest amount of similarity was found for the perceived simi-
larity of values held by British and Polish people. Participants who
saw the values of British and Polish people as superimposed
normal distributions also thought that the two groups get along
more easily, are closer to each other, and that British people have
a more positive evaluation of Polish people, compared with those
who saw the restricted barplots (see Figure 8). As the PCR for the
first item is below 50 and the AE above 50 (PCR  24, 95% CI
[13, 35], AE  51, 95% CI [46, 53]), this is an example of real
Figure 7. Three modes of depicting the same data: two superimposed normal distributions and two barplots
(one with restricted range, the other with full range) with 95% confidence intervals for PCR  86 (percentage
of common responses), AE  6 (absolute effect), and d  .36 (Study 3). Participants were exposed to 10 graphs
simultaneously, one for each value. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Table 2
Analyses of Group Ratings in Four One-Way ANOVAs and Post Hoc Tests (Study 3)
Dependent
variables
Normal
M (SD)
Restricted
M (SD)
Unrestricted
M (SD)
ANOVAs Pairwise comparisons with PCR [95% CI]/d
F dfs ˆG2 N-R N-U R-U
Similarity of B and
p values 67.75 (16.04) 25.66 (19.69) 73.91 (12.59) 214.68 2, 247 .63 24 [13, 35]/2.34 83 [72, 95]/0.43 15 [6, 26]/2.91
How easy do B and
P get along? 79.01 (14.13) 59.99 (22.34) 77.67 (18.57) 27.25 2, 247 .18 61 [50, 72]/1.02 97 [85, 100]/0.08 67 [54, 79]/0.86
IOS scale 5.42 (1.30) 3.65 (1.32) 5.20 (1.39) 43.84 2, 247 .26 50 [38, 61]/1.35 93 [81, 100]/0.17 57 [44, 69]/1.14
Overall B evaluation
of Ps 76.92 (16.43) 68.29 (20.72) 76.64 (16.85) 3.71 2, 148 .05 82 [66, 97]/0.46 99 [82, 100]/0.02 83 [68, 97]/0.44
Note. CI  confidence interval; PCR  percentage of common responses; ANOVA  analysis of variance; AE  absolute effect; B  British people;
P  Polish people; IOS  inclusion of the other in the self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992); Restricted (R)  restricted bar-plots; normal (N) 
superimposed normal distributions; unrestricted (U)  unrestricted bar-plots; N-R  pairwise comparison of normal and restricted condition with PCR and
Cohen’s d. AEs are omitted for brevity.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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differences between groups, according to our taxonomy. Also, we
found group differences between the participants who saw the
barplots with unrestricted y-axes and those who saw them with
restricted y-axes (PCR  15, 95% CI [6, 25], AE  55, 95% CI
[49, 60]). Thus, the currently predominant way of presenting
scientific results, with graphs using a restricted y-axis, led to an
overestimation of the actual differences. Participants in the unre-
stricted barplot condition gave the same responses, on average, as
participants in the normal distribution condition.
Study 4
In this study, we tested whether the principal findings of Study
3 would also hold in high school students, with a different type of
graph that highlights similarity: a radar-chart (see Figure 9). The
data again concern similarities and differences in human values.
More specifically, we examined whether the currently predomi-
nant way of displaying results (restricted barplots with error bars)
would again lead to an overestimation of differences, whereas
presenting the same data in the form of a radar-chart would lead to
a more accurate perception of the results. We also tested whether
the different modes in presentation would have an impact on
participants’ attitudes toward an outgroup.
Method
Participants. Based on the results of Studies 2 and 3, we
assumed a large effect size of d 0.80. A power analysis revealed
that a sample size of 28 participants per cell would be required for
a power of .90. Participants were 54 high school students (Mage 
17.13, SD  0.73, 81.48% women).
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented with
either a radar-chart displaying all 10 values or 10 single barplots
with CIs (see Figure 9). Subsequently, participants responded to
three items on a scale from 0 to 100, similar to Study 3: “How
similar are the values of British and Polish people?”, “How easily
do you think British and Polish people can get along with each
other?”, and “How much do you think British and Polish people
like each other?” Again, participants were informed that these
results came from real data provided by 2,264 British respondents,
originating from www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
Results and Discussion
Participants who were exposed to the information format em-
phasizing similarity (i.e., radar-chart) subsequently exhibited more
intergroup positivity on all three dependent variables than did
participants exposed to the traditional format emphasizing differ-
ences (i.e., barplots). That is, participants perceived the values of
British and Polish people to be more similar (M  70.45, SD 
14.23) than did those in the difference condition (M  30.61,
SD  24.70), t(32.71)  6.93, p  .001, PCR  30, 95% CI [7,
53], AE  50, 95% CI [39, 58], d  2.06. Participants in the
similarity condition also thought that British and Polish people get
along with each other more easily (M  78.65, SD  14.97) than
did those in the difference condition (M  50.43, SD  24.51),
t(33.95)  4.89, p  .001, PCR  47, 95% CI [25, 68], AE  35,
95% CI [18, 46], d  1.44. Finally, participants in the similarity
condition thought that British and Polish people like each other
more (M  65.30, SD  20.43) than did those in the difference
condition (M  54.29, SD  19.17), t(44.88)  1.97, p  .056,
PCR  78, 95% CI [55, 98], AE  17, 95% CI [0, 31], d  0.55
(see Figure 10). Overall, the currently predominant way of pre-
senting scientific results on graphs with a restricted y-axis led to an
overestimation of the actual differences between the two groups.
Figure 8. Amount of agreement to four items (Study 3). B  British people; P  Polish people; IOS 
inclusion of the other in the self (broadened from the 1–7 response scale to 0–100). See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
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Study 5
In Studies 2 to 4 we relied on simulated or archival data.
Further, the similarities in the presented data were substantial. In
Study 5, we aimed to replicate and extend the results of Studies 2
to 4 by using data from two large, influential, and controversial
studies. The criteria for selecting influential studies were that the
study had to be (a) disseminated to the general public (e.g., through
news coverage), (b) based on a large sample size, (c) focused on
the comparison of two polarized groups, and (d) controversial. The
first selected study involved comparisons of the five moral foun-
dations of conservatives and liberals (Graham et al., 2011). The
second study was a meta-analysis in which it was found that the IQ
of religious nonbelievers is around seven points higher than that of
religious believers (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). We
again presented the key findings of both studies either with a
Figure 9. Two modes of depicting the same data: a radar-chart and a barplot with 95% confidence intervals
for PCR 86 (percentage of common responses), AE 7 (absolute effect), d 0.36. Note that 10 barplots were
presented simultaneously, one plot for each value type (Study 4). See the online article for the color version of
this figure.
Figure 10. Amount of agreement with three items (Study 4). B  British people; P  Polish people. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
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restricted barplot or with superimposed normal distributions. Ad-
ditionally, we presented the five moral foundations in the form of
a simple line-graph—one of the standard ways in which Graham,
Haidt, and colleagues present their findings both in scientific
articles (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and in the dissem-
ination of their findings to the general public (e.g., see their Web
pageatyourmorals.orgorHaidt’sTED-Ed talkhttps://www.youtube
.com/watch?v8SOQduoLgRw). Finally, we explored whether
the mode of presentation would also affect participants’ ratings of
the quality of the research.
Method
Participants. Based on the results of Studies 3 and 4, we
assumed a large effect size of f  0.40. A power analysis revealed
that a sample size of 27 participants for each of the three cells
would be required for a power of .90. In total, 157 participants
were recruited online with a mean age of 33.37 years (SD 11.44,
43.87% women). There were 115 participants who had a university
degree and 40 had less than a university degree (two missing
values). All participants were living in the United States and none
had participated in Studies 2 or 3.
Materials and procedure. Participants were informed that
they would see “the findings of two influential scientific studies.
You will be asked a few questions about the findings themselves
and about your impression of the quality of the scientific studies.”
Participants were then randomly allocated to one of the three types
of graphs displaying the moral foundations of conservatives and
liberals and answered six questions after being given a short
introduction to and definition of the moral foundations. Next,
participants were randomly allocated to one of two groups and
shown the results of the IQ comparisons of religious believers and
nonbelievers, and answered the same six questions again. Finally,
participants reported the strength of their religiosity on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (not religious at all) to 7 (very religious),
their religious denomination (if any), their political orientation on
a 11-point scale ranging from 1 (very left) to 11 (very right), and
how they estimate their intelligence compared with everyone liv-
ing in the United States, ranging from 0 (far below average) to 100
(far above average).
We used the means and SDs of all five moral foundations for
4,128 conservatives and 21,933 liberals reported by Graham et al.
(2011) to create the graphs we used as stimuli material (see online
supplemental materials). The amount of similarity between con-
servatives and liberals was substantially smaller than was the case
for the value comparisons used in Studies 3 and 4. The PCR ranged
from 67 (d  0.86) for harm to 37 (d  1.81) for purity, with
liberals scoring higher on harm and conservatives higher on purity.
The layout of the graphs with the superimposed normal distribu-
tions and the barplot was the same as the one used in Study 3 (see
Figure 7, left and middle panel; see the online supplemental
materials for the graphs). We created one graph for each of the five
moral foundations and presented all five graphs together. The
line-graph contained all five moral foundations together on the
x-axis, with two lines representing the mean relevance for conser-
vatives and liberals, respectively.
Participants in all three groups were informed that they would
“see the results of a study examining how more than 25,000
conservatives and liberals from several countries (but mainly the
US) rated the importance of five moral concerns for them person-
ally.” This was followed by a short summary of the moral foun-
dations research, including the method and definitions of each of
the moral foundations. Additionally, we added a link to the full
version of the Graham et al. (2011) article. Next, participants
responded to six items on a slider measure ranging from 0 to 100
with appropriate labels for the endpoints: (a) “How similar are the
moral foundations of conservatives and liberals?”, (b) “How easily
do you think conservatives and liberals can get along with each
other?”, (c) “Do the findings of this study make sense to you
overall?”, (d) “What is your overall impression of the results of
this study?”, (e) “As you know, scientific evidence can vary in
quality. How do you judge the quality of this study?”, and (f) “Do
you think the researchers who conducted the study were biased
(i.e., were hoping to get a specific finding), making the results less
valid?”
The data for the graphs displaying the IQ difference of religious
believers and nonbelievers were extracted from Zuckerman et al.
(2013), who in their meta-analysis found that the mean IQ differ-
ence is 7.3 points. Because more exact descriptive statistics were
missing, we used the standard distribution of the IQ (M  100 and
SD  15) to create the graphs. Specifically, we assumed that the
IQ of the believers to be 100–7.3/2  96.35 and the IQ of
nonbelievers to be 100 
 7.3/2  103.65. This means that the
amount of similarity between the two groups is PCR  81 (d 
0.49). We further assumed that the overall sample size was 10,000,
a rather conservative estimate given that the meta-analysis con-
tained 63 studies (determining the exact number per cell is not
possible, because many studies were correlational). The design of
the graph with the superimposed normal distribution and the graph
with the barplots was again the same as in Study 3 (see Figure 7,
left and middle panel; the only change was that the colors were
orange and green; see the online supplemental materials for the
graphs). This study was introduced and summarized in a similar
way to the one about the moral foundations; the six items were
adapted to the content of the study (e.g., “How similar is the IQ of
believers and non-believers?”).
Results and Discussion
First, we tested whether education moderated any effect of
graph type by including education (lower vs. higher) as a second
factor in the 12 two-way ANOVAs. However, none of the six
interactions of education with the six moral foundations items was
significant (Fs  1.20, ps  .30) and only one of interactions of
education with the six IQ items was significant (Fs  1, ps  .50
for the other five items). Therefore, we collapsed the responses of
lower and higher educated people. We then tested whether political
attitude moderated the effect for the graphs presenting the moral
foundations of conservatives and liberals, and whether strength of
religious belief moderated the effect for the graphs presenting the
IQs of believers and nonbelievers. We did this in a series of linear
regressions including interaction terms. However, out of the 12
interaction terms we computed for the moral foundation analysis
(barplots vs. line-graphs and barplots vs. normal distributions for
all six DVs), only one was significant, B  2.67, SE  1.35,
t(147)  1.98, p  .049, while the other 11 interaction terms were
not significant, ts(146–149)  1.64, ps  .10. For the six inter-
actions of the IQ portion of the study, again only one was signif-
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icant, B  4.43, SE  2.08, t(149)  2.13, p  .035, whereas
the other five were not, ts(149–150)  1.78, ps  .07. Therefore,
we collapsed our results across political attitudes and strength of
religious belief.
In a next step, we tested whether response time moderated any
of the observed effects. This assumption is based on the elabora-
tion likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which leads to the
prediction that people who respond faster might be more influ-
enced by shallow attributes (peripheral route), whereas those who
spend more time elaborating (central route) would not. Specifi-
cally, we assumed that the effect of presentation mode would be
stronger for those who responded faster because these participants
spent less time carefully examining the graphs and the descrip-
tions. However, none of the 12 interaction terms was significant
(all Fs  1.50, all ps  .20).
As predicted, and consistent with the findings of Studies 3 and
4, participants clearly considered the similarities to be larger
between conservatives and liberals and between believers and
nonbelievers when the findings were presented in the form of
superimposed normal distributions as opposed to barplots with a
restricted y-axis (Table 3 and Figure 11). Additionally, participants
in the normal distribution condition thought that members of both
groups could get along easier with each other than participants in
the barplot condition. When the findings were presented in the
form of a line-graph, the perceived similarities between the two
groups and the perceived ease with which they could get along
with each other fell between the other two conditions. Addition-
ally, we found that the overall quality of both studies was per-
ceived to be higher by those participants who saw the superim-
posed normal distributions. No consistent pattern was found for the
other three quality-related items, showing that the mode of pre-
sentation did not affect, for example, the extent to which the
researchers were perceived to be biased.
General Discussion
The five studies presented here found evidence consistent with
our argument that similarities between groups should be reported
alongside mean differences. This argument was supported by three
findings: similarities are typically larger than mean differences;
reporting similarities leads on average to more accurate interpre-
tations of research findings; and reporting similarities between
ingroups and outgroups leads to more positive attitudes toward the
outgroups.
Rather than focusing on comparisons of means, as is routinely
done in psychological research and other social and medical sci-
ences (e.g., when reporting t tests), we argue that it is important to
analyze and interpret the extent of overlap between all responses.
Doing this enables recipients of scientific communications to draw
different conclusions from the data and also has some intriguing
implications, which we discuss below, after summarizing the find-
ings. Study 1 showed that across all 22 variables we examined, the
average PCR was 93 when we compared people from different
genders, ages, educational attainments, incomes, countries, and
religious denominations. This high level of similarity was corrob-
orated by the AE. With an average of .05 across all categories and
Table 3
Results of 12 One-Way ANOVAs and Pairwise Comparisons
Dependent
variables
Normal
M (SD)
Barplots
M (SD)
Line-graph
M (SD)
ANOVA Pairwise comparisons with PCR [95% CI]/d
F ˆG2 N-B N-L B-L
Moral foundations
How similar are A
and B 49.36 (19.54) 16.67 (21.66) 39.50 (20.90) 34.31 .31 43 [24, 59]/1.59 81 [64, 96]/0.49 59 [41, 75]/1.07
Ease of getting
along 48.77 (20.88) 24.67 (18.68) 40.37 (17.73) 21.22 .22 54 [39, 69]/1.22 83 [67, 97]/0.43 67 [51, 82]/0.86
Do findings make
sense? 72.27 (20.79) 61.02 (27.09) 78.25 (20.20) 7.52 .09 82 [67, 96]/0.47 88 [73, 99]/0.29 72 [57, 86]/0.72
Overall impression? 69.08 (20.20) 59.33 (27.70) 71.60 (20.25) 4.10 .05 84 [69, 98]/0.40 95 [78, 100]/0.12 80 [66, 95]/0.51
Quality of study? 64.06 (20.36) 53.54 (24.91) 64.92 (20.20) 4.36 .05 82 [67, 96]/0.46 98 [82, 100]/0.04 80 [66, 95]/0.50
Were researchers
biased? 48.02 (23.21) 54.13 (28.02) 39.18 (22.81) 4.73 .06 91 [75, 100]/0.24 85 [69, 98]/0.38 77 [62, 92]/0.58
Intelligence quotient
How similar are A
and B 72.54 (18.35) 36.53 (29.77) 83.17 .35 47 [34, 59]/1.46
Ease of getting
along 66.96 (22.28) 47.11 (23.67) 28.94 .16 67 [54, 79]/0.86
Do findings make
sense? 68.10 (24.52) 60.60 (27.87) 3.17 .02 89 [76, 99]/0.29
Overall impression? 61.83 (24.48) 57.89 (29.30) .83 .01 94 [82, 100]/0.15
Quality of study? 60.86 (21.62) 50.74 (26.60) 6.84 .04 83 [71, 96]/0.42
Were researchers
biased? 47.56 (23.10) 54.64 (27.61) 3.01 .02 89 [76, 99]/0.28
Note. CI  confidence interval; PCR  percentage of common responses; ANOVA  analysis of variance; AE  absolute effect; Moral foundations 
conservatives and liberals are compared; intelligent quotient  religious and nonreligious people are compared; barplots (B)  restricted bar-plots; normal
(N)  superimposed normal distributions; line-graph (L); N-B, N-L, and B-L  pairwise comparisons between the three conditions with PCR and Cohen’s
d. AEs are omitted for brevity. ANOVA dfs for MF: 2/152–154, dfs for IQ: 1/153–154.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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variables, this shows that the median difference between any two
groups was only one-twentieth of the possible difference on the
scale in question. Indeed, the average of the largest mean differ-
ences between two groups across two studies (Study 1 and a
similar study of a different dataset, containing responses from 29
European countries [N  54,082, reported in the online supple-
mental materials]) and all categories on all variables is AE  .16
(median  9), which is less than one-seventh of the possible range
(mean of the 132 smallest PCRs  78 and median  86 across all
variables and categories).
Countries were on average less similar to each other than were
groups within other categories. This challenges the claim that
countries are more similar to each other than are people with
different socioeconomic status (Greenfield, 2014). The lowest
degree of similarity we found across all comparisons was for moral
attitudes toward personal and sexual issues. This result is broadly
consistent with Graham et al.’s (2011) evidence that the largest
differences between various groups of people—mainly liberals and
conservatives—is on the moral dimension purity, which is closely
related to moral attitudes toward personal and sexual issues.
Figure 11. Amount of agreement with all items after being exposed to different types of graphs displaying
moral foundations of conservatives and liberals (top panel) and the IQs of believers and nonbelievers (bottom
panel; Study 5). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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In summary, the findings of Study 1 and the study reported in
the online supplemental materials support the universalism claim
in cross-cultural research, which holds that values, attitudes, and
beliefs are only weakly influenced by cultural factors (Berry et al.,
2011). However, we can now be more confident that country has
a relatively strong influence on variables like human values, inde-
pendently of religious denomination, education and income level,
or age distribution, extending previous research on cross-country
similarities of values (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz &
Bardi, 2001). If country differences were mainly because of dif-
ferences in religious denomination, education level, or age distri-
bution, we would have found groups in these categories to be less
similar to each other than countries. By contrast, we found that
countries were less similar to each other than were groups in these
other categories.
The finding that similarities between various groups outweigh
differences across a range of psychological variables might be
considered as surprising giving that most research claims to have
found differences between groups (Fanelli, 2010). However, from
a biological or evolutionary point of view this is less surprising:
Well over 99% of our DNA is shared and every group or society
needs to develop some shared standards of communication and
action to function effectively. For example, it has been argued that
social selection “favored genes that gave rise to new, more pro-
social motives” (Boyd & Richerson, 2009, p. 3281). More specif-
ically, as Schwartz and Bardi (2001) have argued, benevolence
values (e.g., loyalty, honesty) are similar across countries because
they guide human cooperation and supportive relationships. Uni-
versalism values (e.g., equality, broad-mindedness) are important
in every society because they guide the commitment to outgroup
members, with whom most groups and societies need to form some
kind of relations either in schools or workplaces or, on a larger
setting, when trading. Security is also highly valued across coun-
tries because in evolutionary terms there have often been threats
from out- and ingroup members. The resulting similarities are
manifested in many international agreements. For example, more
than 190 countries belong to international crime police organiza-
tions (ICPO or INTERPOL), which indicates that they share at
least some common policies regarding prevention of and responses
to criminal behavior. Another example is the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948), which has been signed by almost
every nation and demonstrates that humans share a common sys-
tem of values (Bobbio, 1996). Below we first discuss some impli-
cations of our findings for the reporting of research findings,
before discussing an example of these implications, focusing on
cross-cultural research and the definition of culture.
Implications
Given the focus of the principal statistical tests used in psychol-
ogy, it is common for researchers to focus almost exclusively on
mean differences. This article provides several methods for also
calculating and displaying similarities. Reporting similarities helps
readers to interpret mean differences more appropriately. Consider
an example taken directly from the results of the between-country
comparisons: A researcher comparing two countries could report
that the mean difference between them had an effect size of d 
.39, but with 84% common responses and only an 11% difference
in scale use. Reporting the results in this way avoids the tendency
to oversimplify the findings by focusing simply on mean differ-
ences. Focusing only on mean differences is one way in which
social scientists might inadvertently steer people into regarding
differences between groups as entrenched. As Studies 3 to 5
demonstrate, reporting observed similarities between groups offers
a way of counteracting racism, xenophobia, and prejudice regard-
ing people from another country or people who hold another
ideological view. Therefore, we argue that, especially in the case
of research that focuses on comparisons between polarized groups
(e.g., those based on ideology, religion, or education), researchers
should not fail to highlight similarities between the groups, espe-
cially when communicating to the public (e.g., via press releases).
More important, in contrast to previous research that has found that
highlighting similarities improves intergroup attitudes (e.g.,
Brown & Abrams, 1986), in the current research we have pre-
sented exactly the same information in different ways, rather than
relying on different information to manipulate a focus on similarity
or difference. Further, our approach allows presentation of infor-
mation about large groups of participants, preventing group sub-
typing, which is a psychological response often used to protect
stereotypes (Richards & Hewstone, 2001).
Furthermore, the presentation of similarity information is useful
even when differences are small but reliable. Although people
might infer that similarity is high from the fact that the differences
are small, this inference runs the risk of being misleading if it is not
concretely framed. Discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or
gender is a case in point. For example, if people belonging to a
specific group (e.g., ethnic minorities or women) earn less than
those in other groups, the similarity measures discussed here
would enable researchers to frame such differences more con-
cretely. For example, it is less easy to comprehend a statement that
the (small) gender wage difference within a specific company is d 
0.24 than a statement that 90% of men and women employees share
the same salary, but that in most of the remaining cases women have
lower salaries. This concrete interpretation fosters greater realization
that the key problem is to identify when women’s salaries are lower
and to understand why this is the case. Thus, the meaning and
implications of small effects are likely to be enhanced when research-
ers report these effects in the context of the observed similarities
(Prentice & Miller, 1992).
A stronger focus on similarities in published research should
also help to reduce the “file-drawer” problem (Rosenthal, 1979)
because both statistically large and statistically small differences
between groups are potentially more interesting against the back-
drop of similarity information. This would make the documenta-
tion of similarities between some groups and variables an inter-
esting exercise in its own right, which might also increase the
number of variables that are used to compare groups. At the
moment, variables are often chosen on the basis of their perceived
likelihood of revealing differences, potentially biasing the litera-
ture before any data are collected (Fiedler, 2011).
It should be noted that our proposal is descriptive. Null hypoth-
esis significance testing and Bayesian statistics are complementary
with our approach. When comparing two groups, larger p values
and smaller Bayes factors—ceteris paribus—imply greater simi-
larity. Crucially, however, neither of the two indices nor any of the
commonly used effect sizes directly communicates similarity. We
suggest that as well as reporting differences, researchers should
18 HANEL, MAIO, AND MANSTEAD
report measures of similarity to fully reflect the nature of the
effects in question.
Reanalyzing the Concept of Culture
Culture is the construct most often used in cross-cultural re-
search. It has been defined in various ways, for example by
Hofstede (2001) as the “the collective programming of the mind
that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people
from another” (p. 9). Culture further determines “the uniqueness of
a human group in the same way personality determines the unique-
ness of an individual” (p. 10). This definition of Hofstede has been
challenged, because the assumption that there exist both “substan-
tial within-group agreement and between-group differences”
(Schwartz, 2014, p. 6) has been empirically rebutted. For both
personality traits and values, within-country variability has been
found to be 9 to 15 times larger than between-country variability
(Allik, 2005; Berry et al., 2011; Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Based
on these findings, it has been argued that larger differences can be
found between groups with a different socioeconomic background
(Greenfield, 2014) or across variables other than values (Morris,
2014).
However, both Greenfield (2014) and Morris (2014)—as well as
most other researchers who claimed to have found large differ-
ences across countries—based their conclusions on comparisons
between means and the rules of thumb proposed by Cohen (1992)
concerning when an effect size should be called small, medium, or
large. As we demonstrated in the above, equating mean differences
with group differences is mostly unjustified because even “highly
significant” differences between means usually involve large sim-
ilarities between the groups in question. In fact, the average
similarity found in Study 1 and the study reported in the online
supplemental materials was above 90% across various categories
and variables. Nevertheless, we also found some differences be-
tween countries for variables such as moral attitudes toward
personal-sexual issues. Further, as we argue in the limitation
section below, studying other variables or participant groups might
have resulted in smaller similarities.
Based on these findings and reflections, we propose a more
flexible, relativistic, and quantitative view of culture: Individuals
or groups of individuals belong to different cultures if they are
more different than similar on a specific variable (e.g., if the PCR
is below 50). If all or most members of two groups differ from
each other on a specific variable, they arguably belong to different
cultures. For example, in Study 1, we found that Pakistanis, on the
one hand, and Dutch and Swedish participants, on the other,
displayed differences in their moral attitudes toward personal-
sexual issues such as abortion or homosexuality. However, for
many other variables (cf. Supplementary Table 1), the similarities
between these groups were again larger than the differences. This
means that the majority of Pakistani and Dutch/Swedish partici-
pants belong to different cultures, but only with regard of moral
attitudes toward personal-sexual issues. For many other variables
(e.g., values), they are culturally more similar than different and,
therefore, do not belong to different cultures.
In a similar manner, the United Kingdom and most continental
European countries belong to both similar and different cultures.
They belong to different cultures with regard to the side of the road
on which people drive, currency, language, and the size of univer-
sity tuition fees. However, with regard to many other societal,
political, and psychological variables, they belong to the same
culture. To phrase it more broadly: If two groups of people differ
along variable X, they belong to two cultures on X. There is little
empirical support for the default approach in cross-cultural re-
search, which is to ascribe people living in one country a lot of
attributes simply because this country differs from other countries
in terms of mean scores on one abstract dimension. This might
explain why a range of studies have failed to find even mean
differences between so-called individualistic and collectivistic
countries, despite the fact that differences were or could have been
expected based on differences in the individualism-collectivism
dimension (e.g., Berry et al., 2011; Fiske, 2002; Georgas, Berry,
van de Vijver, Kagitçibasi, & Poortinga, 2006; Lee & Johnson-
Laird, 2006; Nisbett, 2004). In other words, people should be
simultaneously distinguished directly on the putative cultural cat-
egories to which they are assigned and the related psychological
variables, rather than using demographic categories alone (e.g.,
country of origin) to infer psychological differences.
This view of culture as variable-dependent can stimulate more
empirically driven research. For example, the large similarities
found between Eastern and Western countries on individualism
(e.g., self-direction) and collectivism (e.g., tradition values) also
indicate that approximately half of the participants in a Western
country (e.g., United States) score higher on individualism than
half of the participants of an Eastern country (e.g., Japan)—and
vice versa. A large cluster-analysis could be used to explore what
distinguishes those scoring high on individualism from those scor-
ing low on it (e.g., type of profession). This could also be done
across many categories and variables to find groups of people who
differ on one or more variables.
Limitations
Although our results show that similarities are much larger than
differences over a wide range of measures, they are likely to be
dependent on the measures used. The variables included in our
studies are widely used in social sciences to examine differences
between groups, but we might have detected smaller similarities
with other measures (cf. Morris, 2014). For example, although
questions about whether it is appropriate to make jokes about a
religion or to burn its holy scriptures are likely give rise to similar
responses among many if not all groups of people, cultural and
religious similarities might well be smaller if respondents were
asked whether such behavior would be a reason to enact corporal
or capital punishment. Indeed, our data indicate that personal
moral issues exhibit relatively low levels of between-country sim-
ilarity. Thus, more measures focused on such issues might have
revealed lower levels of similarity, on average.
Another limitation concerns the sample used. Although our
samples from the WVS and the European Social Survey (ESS;
see online supplemental materials) can be considered as repre-
sentative (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011), the respondents are
mostly literate, willing to complete a questionnaire, and may be
more likely to be influenced by other cultures because they
were willing to participate in a cross-country survey (polycul-
turalism; Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). Indeed, other research has
shown that differences between small-scale societies such as
savanna foragers in Tanzania and tundra-taiga hunters and
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fishers in Siberia are larger than those between student samples
in different countries (Henrich et al., 2006).
To reiterate a point made earlier in this article, we are not
arguing that small mean differences are unimportant. In many
instances, small to large mean differences are meaningful, despite
partially reflecting large similarities (cf. Prentice & Miller, 1992).
Take the similarities in values across countries, for example. In
Study 1 and the study reported in the online supplemental mate-
rials, we found that the average similarities in values exceed 90%
across more than 70 countries, indicating that the mean differences
are small. Nevertheless, the country means for some value types,
such as self-direction or autonomy, are strongly (rs  .60) corre-
lated with how peaceful or democratic a country is (Basabe &
Valencia, 2007; Schwartz, 2006). In such instances, it can be
useful to report the degree of similarity because this shows the
importance of relatively small deviations from a perfect degree of
similarity. The ability of small differences to matter greatly is not
in doubt; just as tiny differences in DNA between people can have
enormous impact on their lives, small differences in psychological
variables can have repercussions that extend well beyond their
apparent size.
All that we suggest is that research should complement the
dominant focus on differences with an explicit recognition of
similarities; otherwise these similarities go unnoticed. That said,
future research might identify other ways to go about this task. For
instance, one limitation of our recommended indices pertains to the
restriction of the AE to variables that have noninfinite lower and
upper bounds (e.g., Likert or bipolar scales). Although the AE can
be generalized to other scales, such as RTs, researchers might
discover easy-to-use alternatives that work across virtually infinite
ranges. For now, all that is required is to define a reasonable
minimum and maximum within which a specific proportion (e.g.,
99%) of participants fall across various groups of participants and
tasks.
Conclusion
The present research demonstrates alternative ways of reporting
quantitative data comparisons between groups. In the course of
making more than 168,000 comparisons, we found that similarities
between any two groups of humans generally far outweigh the
differences between them. Although the degree of similarity de-
pends on the groups and measures used, the fact that our conclu-
sions are based on a large range and number of comparisons leads
us to expect that future research will also find substantial similarity
on many psychological variables.
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